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INTRODUCTION 
An outbreak of a novel respiratory infection causing 
atypical pneumonia occurred during late 2002 and 
continues in 2003. Spread of this infection from the 
initial cases in Guangdong Province in China has not 
only occurred in other areas within China, including 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but has 
also resulted in confirmed or probable cases in 26 other 
countries on four continents as of 26 April 2003.l Of 
particular concern is that there has been well-docu- 
mented spread from patients to health care workers 
(HCWs), and subsequent secondary spread to contacts 
of these individuals. There have been 4836 probable 
cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 
resulting in 293 deaths that have been reported to the 
World Health Organization (WHO),l giving a case- 
mortality rate of 6.1%. 
As the etiologic agent or agents were initially 
unknown, a syndromic definition was used for epidemio- 
logic purposes in order to define cases. This definition, 
which has been modified over time, has most recently 
been updated for the USA as summarized in Table 1.2 
Early reports of the etiologic agent of the syndrome 
included a member of the genus Chlamydia, a para- 
myxovirus, and a Mycoplasma species. Most recently, a 
novel coronavirus has been identified as the etiologic 
agent of SARS,3-5 although this agent has not been 
recovered in a significant fraction of the cases of SARS 
in Canada. Coronavirus infections, which are known to 
affect many vertebrates, have been identified, along with 
rhinoviruses, as common causes of upper respiratory 
tract infections. There is precedent for pneumonia due 
to coronaviral infections in humans. Human coronavirus 
OC43 strains have been shown to be present in lower 
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respiratory tract infections, including cases of pneumonia 
and bronchiolitis in Normandy, France, and, in a number 
of cases in both children and adults, it was the only 
etiologic agent identified.6 
On 14 March 2003, the WHO issued a global health 
alert for authorities to be aware of a new atypical 
pneumonia (SARS) reported in several countries in 
Southeast Asia. This was the first global alert from 
the WHO in more than a decade. The international 
dimension of the SARS outbreak, which is regarded as 
being beyond the control of any single government, has 
resulted in a great deal of work in a short period of time, 
although, as of this date, there is no known effective 
therapy. 
Table 1. Case definition for SARS (U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention)2 
Suspect case 
Respiratory illness of unknown etiology with onset since 
1 February 2003, and the following criteria: 
Measured temperature greater than 100.4”F (greater than 
38°C) and 
One or more clinical findings of respiratory illness (e.g. 
cough, shortness of breath, difficulty in breathing, or 
hypoxia) and 
Travela within 10 days of onset of symptoms to an area 
with documented or suspected community transmission 
of SARS (see list below; excludes areas with secondary 
cases limited to health care workers or direct household 
contacts) or 
Close contactb within 10 days of onset of symptoms with 
a person known to be a suspect SARS case. 
Probable case 
A suspect case with one of the following: 
Radiographic evidence of pneumonia or respiratory distress 
syndrome 
Autopsy findings consistent with respiratory distress 
syndrome without an identifiable cause 
aTravel includes transit in an airport in an area with documented or 
suspected community transmission of SARS. 
Areas with documented or suspected community transmission of SARS: 
People’s Republic of China (i.e. mainland China and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region); Hanoi, Vietnam; Singapore; and Toronto, 
Canada. 
Wose contact is defined as having cared for, having lived with or having 
direct contact with respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a patient 
known to be a suspect SARS case. 
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EPIDEMIOLOGY 
The impressive transmission within health care facilities 
of SARS is illustrated in Figure 1.’ It is of note that this 
resulted not only in transmission of the infection to 
many hospitals within Hong Kong, but it also resulted in 
a multi-country spread of the infection, resulting in cases 
in Asia, Europe, and North America. 
As noted in Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report,7 
the epidemiologic investigation of the cluster seen in 
Figure 1 suggested that, as of 2.5 March 2003 there was 
a cluster of 13 persons with suspected/probable SARS 
who are known to have stayed at hotel M. The index 
patient (patient A) had onset of symptoms on 15 
February. He traveled from Guangdong Province, China 
to Hong Kong to visit his family, and stayed on the ninth 
floor of the hotel on 21 February. He was admitted to 
hospital 2 on 22 February, and died the next day. Four 
health care workers and two of his family members 
subsequently became ill; one family member died. Of 
the 12 other patients linked to hotel M, 10 were in the 
hotel on the same day as the index patient; the other two 
patients (patients L and M) stayed in the hotel during 
the time that three other symptomatic patients were 
guests in the hotel. Nine of the 13 patients, including 
patient A, stayed on the ninth floor; one stayed on the 
14th floor; one stayed on the 11th floor; and two stayed 
on both the ninth and 14th floors. Epidemiologic investi- 
gations have identified patients from this cluster as 
index patients in subsequent clusters in Hong Kong 
and other areas. Patient B is the index patient for the 
outbreak in Hanoi involving 59 HCWs and close contacts, 
and is also linked to one case in Thailand. Patients C, D 
and E are associated with 70 cases in Singapore and 
three cases in Germany. Patient F is linked with a cluster 
of 16 other cases in Toronto. Patients H and J are linked 
with outbreaks among HCWs in other hospitals in Hong 
Kong. Patient L appears to have become infected during 
his stay at hotel M, with subsequent transmission to his 
wife, patient M. 
It is important to recognize that the current 
definition of a case of SARS is based on a clinical 
syndrome. It may well be that the range of illness due to 
the viral agent includes cases that do not fit the current 
case definition and, as a result, do not meet the criteria 
established for SARS. Thus, the number of clinically ill 
individuals is unknown, as the ratio of those who are 
infected by the coronaviral etiologic agent to those whose 
xtiealth-care workers. 
-All guests except G and K stayed on the 9th floor of the hotel. Guest G stayed on the 14th floor, and Guest K stayed on the 1 Ith floor 0 - , “CIuesTs L and M &pouses) were not at Hotel M durmg the same time as Index Guest A but were at the hotel during the same times as Guests G, H, and I, who 
were ill during this period. 
Figure 1. Chain of transmission of SARS at a hotel in Hong Kong.7 
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symptoms meet the case definition is not known. By 
contrast, as there are several infectious agents that can 
cause a clinically indistinguishable infection, there may 
well be individuals, especially within China, in whom 
the etiology of the illness is due to another agent. These 
cases of atypical pneumonia may meet the case 
definition of SARS, but are due to background noise. 
SARS is mostly spread by exposure to respiratory 
droplets during close face-to-face contact. The initial 
cluster of patients from the index case in the Metropole 
Hotel in Hong Kong was probably infected in the 
elevator lobby. Increased spread by droplet infection by 
the use of nebulizers has been reported.8 
There may be additional routes of transmission.The 
cluster of cases centered around the Amoy Gardens 
Housing Estate in Hong Kong has raised the possibility 
of transmission from an environmental source or the via 
the fecal-oral route. There appears to be no evidence 
among this group of patients for airborne transmission. 
The survival time of the etiologic agent of SARS 
in the environment is critical in interpreting the 
epidemiology of SARS. Coronaviruses have lipid 
envelopes and, thus, are susceptible to inactivation by 
heat, desiccation, oxidizing agents, lipid solvents, non- 
ionic detergents, and ultraviolet irradiation. Survival 
time depends on the viral genotype, the composition 
of carrier and substrate, and the particular situation. 
Respiratory viruses transmitted in droplets or aerosols 
generally have a limited duration and range of infectivity, 
whereas other routes of transmission may be more 
protective (e.g. feces), and so would lead to contamina- 
tion of the environment for longer periods. 
Thus far, cases of SARS have tended to primarily 
involve healthy adults, aged 25-70 years. Rare cases 
have been reported in children. Most of the deaths in the 
Hong Kong outbreak occurred in those with a history of 
chronic diseases, or those who sought treatment late.8 In 
this outbreak, a multivariate analysis identified advanced 
age, a high peak lactate dehydrogenase level and a high 
absolute neutrophil count at presentation as independent 
predictors of an adverse outcome. 
The incubation period is usually 2-7 days, but may 
be as long as 10 days. In the health care setting, SARS is 
highly infectious, with some reported attack rates of 
greater than 50% among HCWs caring for patients with 
SARS. The WHO investigative team also found evidence 
of ‘super-spreaders’ in Guangdong, including one who is 
thought to have infected as many as 100 other persons. 
This could be due to poor infection control procedures, 
specific characteristics of a viral strain, or host factors. 
GLOBAL UPDATE 
By 26 April 2003, the cumulative number of reported 
probable cases of SARS was 4836.l The start of the 
surveillance period was extended back to 1 November 
2002 to capture the cases of atypical pneumonia in 
Guangdong Province in China, which are now recog- 
nized as being cases of SARS. China has reported a total 
of 2753 cases and an additional 1402 cases in the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. Other countries 
heavily affected include Singapore and Canada. Overall, 
almost 30 countries have reported cases of SARS, six of 
which were classified by the WHO as ‘affected areas’. 
These ‘affected areas’ are those in which local chain(s) 
of transmission have been identified, and include Canada 
(Toronto); Singapore; China (Beijing, Guangdong, Hong 
Kong SAR, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi and the Province 
of Taiwan); USA (areas not reported); UK (London); 
and Vietnam (Hanoi). Note that, in Taiwan, London and 
some areas of the USA, the local transmission is limited: 
there is no evidence of international spread from the 
area since 15 March 2003, and no transmission other 
than close person-to-person contact. 
In China, an outbreak of atypical pneumonia con- 
sisting of 305 cases began in Guangdong Province in 
November 2002. However, the Chinese authorities only 
informed the WHO on 11 February 2003. It transpired 
that this outbreak, which is now recognized as SARS, 
dates back to at least 16 November 2002, when an initial 
case was reported in Foshan City. 
More recent data coming out of China have been 
problematic. By mid-April, Chinese health officials 
acknowledged only 37 cases of SARS in Beijing. A week 
later, this number increased to nearly 1200 cases, as the 
Chinese Health Ministry disclosed numerous previously 
unreported and new confirmed and suspected cases. 
It seems that the authorities may have been actively 
suppressing data. This possible underreporting and 
‘denial’ of the disease burden may have resulted in 
increased transmission: for example, disregard of specific 
infection control measures, and failure to recognize the 
need to seek medical attention early to minimize the 
number of potential contacts. Another issue is the division 
of patients between regular and military hospitals, with 
suggestions that patients in military hospitals were not 
included in official figures. There were no restrictions 
placed on travel during the Chinese New Year celebra- 
tions in February 2003, when up to 100 million people 
traveled within China, permitting the spread of the virus 
from one province to another. However, the more recent 
May Day holiday was shortened, to try to prevent the 
massive movement of people. While this is encouraging, 
it may be too late, in that SARS has already spread 
to some of China’s poorest provinces, many of which 
(according to a WHO investigative team) have less 
capacity to cope with the challenge posed by SARS. The 
unfortunate situation in China emphasizes the need for 
transparency in reporting (not just for SARS, but for 
all infectious diseases) and the need for coordinated 
disease-control efforts. 
The outbreak at the Prince of Wales hospital in 
Hong Kong involved 138 patients who were ill between 
11 and 25 March 2003, half of whom were HCWs and 16 
of whom were medical students.8 Overall, 32 patients 
were admitted to intensive care, and there were five 
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deaths. More recently, a cluster of 321 almost simul- 
taneous cases has been recorded in residents of the 
Amoy Gardens housing estate. This large and sudden 
cluster has prompted many questions, such as whether 
transmission could be from an environmental source. 
Patients from the Amoy Gardens commonly presented 
with diarrhea, which is unusual, and their symptoms 
seemed more severe overall. There were also deaths in 
younger, previously healthy individuals. The severity 
may represent infection with high viral loads, following 
exposure to a concentrated environmental source, or 
infection with a virus that is of greater virulence. 
By contrast, Vietnam appears to have controlled the 
SARS outbreak within its borders, but the government 
is considering closing its land border with China in an 
attempt to prevent the importation of SARS cases. 
In Canada, there are currently 30 reported cases 
among approximately 500 members of a religious group 
in Toronto. The index case of this community cluster is 
linked to the first hospital cluster. Local health authorities 
have implemented isolation of all contacts of suspect 
and probable cases, including all 500 members of the 
religious group, to try to contain any further spread 
within and outside of this social network. The degree 
to which the outbreak has been controlled in Toronto 
has been the subject of some debate, as the WHO has 
included it in a list of sites to which travel should be 
restricted (www.who.int/csr/sars/travel). The United 
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, by 
contrast, does not recommend travel restrictions. 
Epidemic curves and frequent updates on SARS, 
including maps, are available on the WHO website 
(www.who.int/csr/sars). 
CLINICAL SYMPTOMS 
The main symptoms and signs include high fever 
(>38”C), dry cough, and shortness of breath or breath- 
ing difficulties. The febrile prodrome may be associated 
with chills, rigors, headache, malaise and myalgia. At 
the onset of illness, some cases have mild respiratory 
symptoms, and some have reported diarrhea. After 
3-7 days, the lower respiratory phase begins: dry cough 
or dyspnea that may be accompanied by or progress to 
hypoxia. A proportion of patients with SARS develop 
severe pneumonia; in one study, 19 of 138 patients 
(14%) of patients admitted to a hospital in Hong Kong 
required intubation and mechanical ventilation.8 
Clinical findings may include chest X-rays (CXR) 
indicative of pneumonia; however, the CXR may be 
normal, especially during the prodrome. Subsequent 
findings may include early focal infiltrates progressing to 
more generalized patchy interstitial infiltrates. During 
the late stages of infection, CXR may demonstrate areas 
of consolidation. 
Laboratory studies may be notable for the presence 
of low lymphocyte count early in the course of disease, 
with a normal or low total white blood cell count. At the 
peak of the respiratory illness, leukopenia and thrombo- 
cytopenia are common. Early in the course of the 
respiratory phase, increased levels of creatine phospho- 
kinase, lactate dehydrogenase and hepatic transaminases 
have been noted.8 Renal function is usually normal. 
ETIOLOGIC AGENT OF SARS 
The international medical and research communities 
responded with unprecedented speed, and identified the 
causative agent as a new coronavirus, now called the 
SARS virus, within 2 months. Genetic analysis indicates 
that the virus is only identical in 50-60% of nucleotide 
sequence to other known coronaviruses. As it is an 
RNA virus, it is inherently highly mutable. Sequence 
comparisons of different isolates of the SARS virus 
show several variable sites, the biological significance of 
which has yet to be determined. Many aspects of the 
behavior of the SARS virus are currently poorly 
understood. Questions include the viral concentrations 
in different body fluids, and the stage of the illness in 
which viral shedding is highest. Survival time in the 
environment, on dry surfaces and in suspension (e.g. 
feces) is also being investigated. There are preliminary 
suggestions that viable virus could be cultured from 
surfaces after 24 h, which is longer than many similar 
viruses are expected to survive in the environment. 
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
The WHO appointed a network of 11 laboratories in 
nine countries to work together to try and develop fast 
and accurate laboratory tests for the SARS virus. There 
is considerable variation in viral shedding between and 
within individuals, and it is unclear when and where the 
virus is shed. It seems that there are different time 
periods for detection of the virus from different clinical 
samples-first from sputum, then from blood, and finally 
from stool. Guidelines on handling samples from 
suspected or probable SARS patients can be found 
on the WHO website (www.who.int/csr/sars/biosafety 
2003-04-25). 
Research is focusing on three main tests: PCR, 
enzyme-linked immunosorbent Assay (ELLSA), and 
immunofluorescence (IF). 
PCR can detect genetic material of the SARS virus 
in various specimens, such as blood, stool, respiratory 
secretions, and body tissue. It is useful in the early stages 
of the illness. Results are generally very specific, but may 
lack sensitivity, in that there are opportunities for false- 
negative results (e.g. if the sample was not collected 
when the virus or its genetic material was present). PCR 
also gives no information on whether the patient is 
infectious to others or not. Primers for the SARS virus 
have been developed and are publicly available on the 
WHO website at www.who.int/csr/sars/primers. A ready- 
to-use PCR test kit containing primers and positive 
and negative controls has also been developed, and its 
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performance is being evaluated by members of the 
WHO laboratory network. 
ELISA detects the presence of antibodies in sera 
from about day 20 of the illness, by which time patients 
may have already spread the virus to others. If specimens 
are collected too early in the course of the illness (before 
antibodies are produced), this may produce a false- 
negative result. 
IF is a reliable test that uses fixed SARS virus, an 
immunofluorescence microscope, and an experienced 
microscopist. It detects antibodies in sera reliably from 
day 10, so confirmation of the diagnosis is delayed. 
It is comparatively slow, and false-negative results are 
problematic. 
The only means to show the existence of a live virus 
is cell culture. This is very demanding, but is considered 
the gold standard, as it is the only test that indicates 
(albeit in retrospect) the ability of an individual to 
transmit infection. 
MANAGEMENT 
Early diagnosis and prompt supportive care improve 
clinical prognosis. Management guidelines can be found 
at www.who.int/csr/sars/management, and are sum- 
marized as follows. 
WHO Revised Guidelines: management of suspect 
and probable SARS cases 
The patient should be admitted to the hospital according 
to the infection control policy (www.who.int/csr/sars/ 
infectioncontrol). Ideally, potentially infected patients 
should be isolated in a negative pressure room, and 
HCWs and visitors accessing the unit should use the 
following personal protective equipment: N95 mask; 
gloves; goggles; disposable gown; footwear that can be 
decontaminated, and an apron. Clinical samples should 
be taken to exclude standard causes of pneumonia 
(including atyp ica pneumonia). The possibility of co- 1 
infection with SARS should be considered, and appro- 
priate chest imaging performed. Tests to aid the clinical 
diagnosis of SARS should be done, including: white 
blood cell count, platelet count, creatine phosphokinase, 
liver function tests, blood urea nitrogen, electrolytes, 
and C-reactive protein. Paired sera should be stored 
for later. Antibiotics for the treatment of community- 
acquired pneumonia with atypical cover are recom- 
mended. Interventions that may cause aerosolization 
should be avoided (e.g. nebulizers, chest physiotherapy, 
bronchoscopy). If patients require the intervention, 
appropriate protective precautions should be taken. 
The antiviral agent ribavirin (with or without corti- 
costeroids) has been tried as treatment in an increasing 
number of patients. However, its effectiveness has not 
been proven. A coordinated multicenter approach to 
establish the effectiveness of ribavirin and other inter- 
ventions has been proposed. There is no evidence for its 
use as prophylaxis, and many experts believe that it will 
be some years before an effective vaccine for the virus 
is available. 
WHO Revised Guidelines: management of contacts of 
probable SARS cases 
A SARS contact is a person who may be at greater risk 
of developing SARS because of exposure to a suspect 
or probable case of SARS (Table 1). A contact of a 
probable SARS case should be given information about 
SARS, and placed under active surveillance for 10 days 
in voluntary home isolation. The contact should record 
his temperature daily, and be visited or telephoned daily 
by a member of the public health care team. If the 
contact develops disease symptoms, they should be 
investigated locally at an appropriate health care facility. 
WHO Revised Guidelines: management of contacts of 
suspect SARS cases 
It is recommended that contacts of suspect cases should 
be given information on the clinical picture and trans- 
mission of SARS and placed under passive surveillance 
for 10 days. The contact is free to continue with his usual 
activities, but if he develops any symptoms, he should 
telephone the public health authority immediately. 
CONCLUSION 
As the work on the virus, its clinical manifestations, 
treatment and prevention proceed, there are many 
unanswered questions that will challenge scientists, 
clinicians, and public health workers. These include: how 
this new virus entered the human population and 
succeeded in spreading so rapidly from person-to- 
person, a phenomenon that is not always the case when 
respiratory viruses make the species jump to humans; 
what the variation at the molecular level means for the 
pathogenesis and epidemiology of this virus; and what 
will be the results over time of its co-evolution with the 
human host. As there are numerous as yet uncharac- 
terized animal viruses that periodically enter the human 
population, this outbreak, although due to a viral in- 
fection with a relatively low mortality rate, should serve 
as a warning to the global public health community of 
the importance of openness in communicating health 
care threats at an early stage. To not do so because of 
political concerns could jeopardize human health due 
to pandemic influenza, a paramyxovirus that is able 
to establish human-to-human transmission, another 
coronavirus, or an unrecognized agent. The political will 
to ensure this openness must be universal, as a single 
area that does not cooperate with such a policy risks the 
health of all humankind. 
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